HAS THE RULE-FOLLOWING PROBLEM A SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS?
The rule-following problem and artificial intelligence systems are discussed in the article. This problem was formulated in tradition of analytic philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. It consists in assertion that human consciousness is incapable to definite rules of one's activity in a exact way. What about artificial intelligence? Can we say that artificial intelligence system is incapable to definite rules of one's activity too? Author of the article tries to answer the question.
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| Name | Organization | |
| Ladov V.A. |
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