Legal content of guilt and culpability in the criminal law of the Russian Federation

The artide disdoses the concept of guilt as a prindple and a fundamental vedor of the diminal law in Russia based on the imputation when the nature of dime is determined. The rarrelation of ob-jedive and mental elements of dime as the categories for its determination is given in an available and logrcal form. Some intelledual and ranative characteristics of a person whrch prove the prese^e of mental element of dime in his behavior when he rammits the ad are emphasized. It is stressed that different rambinations of intelledual and ranative elements of ransdousness form different types of guilt whrch are known to present the intent (both dired and indired) and recklessness (flippancy and negligence) mentioned in Artides 25 and 26 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Adoring to the randusion that guilt as an intellectual-conative system is the category of substantive law presdibed by legislators for definite types of behavior with sodally-dangerous ranse-quences the author analyzes the rarrelation of the above system with the concept of guilt in diminal and diminal prcrcedure laws. As notions of guilt and debility are not diredly disdosed definitions of law it’s necessary to examine the norms of both substantial and p^^ed^al law using the method of ramparison of the form and ranted of the single prcrcess- diminal liability and its grounds. Taking into araount the fad that law doesn’t give reasons for its presdiptions when determining the ads and sentendng, the generally araepted thesis that jurisprudence is science but not the caprice of legislators the author interprets the sense of norms and notions and substantiates their logrcal and sdentifrc validity. He separates the volume and rantent of guilt and ratability using the te^niques of elementary logic The analysis of semantrc meanings of legislators’ statements in offrcial doraments in the state language forms the basis for the interpretation. By reference to logrc, any statement refleds the objedive reality in person’s ransdousness and between phenomena and can be of different types. A guilty person and guilt are an “objedive relation”. So the term “ralpability” can define the form of the phenomenon filled in any case by either intent or recklessness. The above sdentifrc terms lead to the randusion about the rarrelation of guilt and ralpability as different notions of dime where guilt is a statrc category of the legislative model of intelledual-ranative pnrcesses of a wrongdoer. Culpability is a ramulative subjedive asped of the same person under some definite, prohibited by diminal law form of objedive behavior. The author randudes that ralpability is a definite type of objedive behavior when a randete ob-jed of diminal law is endoached and when law spedfies the form and type of guilt.

Keywords

Authors

References