Do constitutional and state-legal relations make up one or two branches of law?

The article examines the existing views on the terminological correlation between the concepts of "constitutional" and "state" law, "constitutional" and "state-legal" relations. Some scholars believe that the science of constitutional law has not developed and defined the correlation between state-legal and constitutional relations, and, referring to O.E. Kutafin and V.O. Luchin, they consider them to be different legal relations, which make up the subject of not one, but two branches of law. The article proves that the thoughts of the quoted authors are taken out of the context, without specifying a concrete page; they are artificially adjusted to the "original" concept of crushing a single subject of regulation into two independent branches of law-constitutional and state one. The views of scientists on the correlation of state-legal and constitutional relations are classified in the article into three concepts. The classic concept involves the identity of subjects; the difference is only in the highlighted accents. There is an emphasis on distinct things within the classical concept: some people consider it to be more correct to name the branch constitutional law, others - state law, still others call the branch in a compromise way - constitutional (state) law. In general, the classical concept relies on the identity of the name of a single and indivisible branch. The concept of constitutionalization is based on the idea of considering constitutional law as the basis, the nucleus, a kind of meta-branch of the entire national legal system, i.e., the branch designed to constitutionalize all branches of Russian law. Not all constitutional relations perform the function of meta-branch, but only basic ones in terms of their content and those that received "constitutional residence" according to their form. The subject of state-legal relations is broader than the subject of the constitution, so constitutional relations make up the part of state-legal relations that are developed beyond the constitution. A few constitutionalists who insist on the division of constitutional and state-legal relations into two separate branches represent the third concept, i.e. the one of splittings of a dual subject. According to this concept, constitutional and state law are two distinct branches and, respectively, two autonomous sciences: the first science is represented by constitutionalists, the second - by state experts. The article proves the inconclusiveness of all the arguments of those who support the division of the dual subject of state (constitutional) law into two independent branches; it substantiates the dual nature of constitutional (state) law. The desire of scientists to emphasize either the constitutional or the state beginning of this branch, and the desire to "separate inseparable" and break the single branch into two separate ones is explained by ideological or taste reasons.

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