Public law enforcement of State sovereignty in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany | Tomsk State University Journal of Law. 2024. № 53. DOI: 10.17223/22253513/53/4

Public law enforcement of State sovereignty in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany

The sharp aggravation of the international situation in recent years has acutely raised the question of the essence and content of state sovereignty of individual countries. The analysis of foreign experience of public-law provision of state sovereignty on the example of such ‘unfriendly’ states as the United States of America (hereinafter - the USA) and the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter also FRG, Germany) has not only cognitive, but also applied value for the improvement of public-law provision of state sovereignty of the Russian Federation. The emergence of the USA as a sovereign state took place in the struggle for independence from Great Britain. The colonial past and opposition to the traditional view of sovereignty as the absolute, unrestricted power of the monarch led to the US adherence to the concept of popular sovereignty, according to which the source of all power is the people. This provision is clearly enshrined in the preamble to the US Constitution, which establishes a system of dualistic federalism, stipulating that not only the federal government, but also the governments of each state within its competence have sovereign powers (granted by the people). The Foreign Agents Registration Act, passed as early as 1938, and the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 play an important role in the public law enforcement of US state sovereignty. These laws contain strict requirements for registration of lobbyists and foreign agents, disclosure of information and general transparency of their activities. Legislation on lobbying and agents of foreign influence also exists at the state level. The requirements for lobbying and foreign agents vary from state to state in terms of their strictness and elaboration, differing significantly from federal legislation, but still strengthening the latter and contributing to the state sovereignty of the United States as a whole. German sovereignty is a consequence of the country's difficult history, which lost it as a result of defeat in World War II and had to rebuild it while in the midst of the Cold War and then as part of the unification process. Membership in NATO and later in the European Union, on the one hand, gave the FRG the opportunity to rise to the same level as other European countries and to get most of its sovereign rights back, on the other hand, it led to a limitation of sovereignty. The public-law provision of German state sovereignty is based on the provisions of the supreme legislative act of the country. According to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, while participating in the development of the European Union, Germany can, by means of a law approved by the Bundestag, transfer sovereign rights not only to the European Union but also to intergovernmental institutions. In addition, the exercise of sovereign state powers falling within the competence of the Lander may be transferred by them, with the consent of the Federal Government, to border agencies of neighbouring states. Unlike the USA, counteraction to foreign influence in the Federal Republic of Germany does not have a developed legislative basis. At the normative level, there is no concept of a ‘foreign agent’ and no single act regulating the activities of collective and individual entities that receive funding or other support from abroad. A single normative legal act regulating lobbying activities, the German Lobbyists' Register Act, was adopted only in 2021, and it applies only to the representation of interests in the German Bundestag and in the Federal Government. The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

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Keywords

public law enforcement, state sovereignty, USA, FRG, lobbyism, foreign influence

Authors

NameOrganizationE-mail
Zubarev Sergey M.Moscow State Law University named after O.E. Kutafinsmzubarev@msal.ru
Kosyrev Evgeniy V.Moscow State Law University named after O.E. Kutafinevkosyrev@msal.ru
Krylova Maria S.Moscow State Law University named after O.E. Kutafinmarie_kr@mail.ru
Всего: 3

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 Public law enforcement of State sovereignty in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany | Tomsk State University Journal of Law. 2024. № 53. DOI: 10.17223/22253513/53/4

Public law enforcement of State sovereignty in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany | Tomsk State University Journal of Law. 2024. № 53. DOI: 10.17223/22253513/53/4

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