Latency of information crime and ways to counter it

The article is devoted to the study of the problem of latency of information crimes, i.e. such acts, in the mechanism of which the use of information technologies and information and telecommunication networks plays a significant role. This type of crime is characterised by hyperlatency: only a very small proportion of committed acts are reflected in criminal statistics, and often the most ‘convenient’ for disclosure and investigation acts are registered, rather than the most dangerous ones. The author considers the latency of information offences on the example of two types of offences: ‘traditional’ computer crimes (unlawful access to computer information, use and distribution of malware) and infringement of copyright and related rights. It summarises data on the scale of cybercrime, its cross-border nature and the amount of damage associated with it. The main threats associated with these types of offences are highlighted. These include, in particular, cyber espionage, cyber sabotage, disclosure of confidential data, attacks on critical information infrastructure, including process control systems, and cyber extortion. Such reasons for their latency are characterised as the use by criminals of the latest technologies to conceal their activities, the abnormally large role of the non-govemmental sector in countering crime, the conflicting interests of victims, and deficiencies in legal regulation. The existence of mass forms of criminal activity is noted, which may involve network communities with a number of members that precludes the possibility of bringing them all to criminal responsibility. In connection with the above, measures aimed at reducing latency are proposed, in particular, increasing the competence of law enforcement agencies whose tasks include combating information crime. This could be achieved by establishing special investigative jurisdiction and jurisdiction over these offences. It may also be necessary to organise the activities of monitoring services that identify and analyse newly emerging threats to Russia's information security and transfer materials to law enforcement agencies for the initiation of criminal proceedings. It seems expedient to encourage responsible business behaviour in the field of countering common threats to information security, and to establish legal sanctions related to the concealment of information incidents. It is pointed out that it is necessary to decriminalise offences in the information sphere that do not pose a great public danger and to reorient law enforcement agencies to fight the most dangerous manifestations of information crime. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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