The main types of algorithmic bookmarks are considered. A method for constructing asymmetric kleptographic bookmarks in the RSA key generator is presented, which allows the owner of the bookmark key (the developer or an authorized intelligence agency) to access a user key generated by an infected algorithm. Theorems illustrating the performance of the described algorithms are formulated, and the computational complexity of these algorithms is estimated. The resistance of the built tabs to some classes of attacks is demonstrated even if the adversary knows the methods used and has access to the source code of the key generator.
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- Title Kleptographic (algorithmic) backdoors in the RSA key generator
- Headline Kleptographic (algorithmic) backdoors in the RSA key generator
- Publesher
Tomsk State University - Issue Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika - Applied Discrete Mathematics 55
- Date:
- DOI 10.17223/20710410/55/2
Keywords
RSA, kleptography, algorithmic backdoor, trapdoor, kleptographic backdoor, backdoorAuthors
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Kleptographic (algorithmic) backdoors in the RSA key generator | Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika - Applied Discrete Mathematics. 2022. № 55. DOI: 10.17223/20710410/55/2
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