Structure vs. Function: Evolution of Corporate Management ( USA Case) | Problems of Governance. 2015. № Том 8. Выпуск 12.

Structure vs. Function: Evolution of Corporate Management ( USA Case)

Five significant events have played a dominant role in the establishment of modern forms and practices of corporate governance in the United States. This - the adoption of the British common law, the decision of the President of the Marshall of the Supreme Court in the case of Dartmouth College, the work of Berle and Means, the growth of the role of institutional investors and the tendency to hostile takeovers in the 1980s, as well as a serious failure in corporate governance in the late 1990s. gg. and the beginning of the XXI century. These five factors have had a strong impact on the corporate governance practices over the last two hundred years. Academic research on corporate governance greatly influenced the formation of the finished painting, demonstrating the role of only one of these factors. We assume that there are six significant event that may be the cause of one of the major changes in corporate governance practices in the United States, and it is almost owes its appearance of academic research

Download file

Counter downloads: 214

Keywords

управление в социальных системах, структура системы, функции системы, корпоративное управление, Management in social systems, system structure, system functions, corporate governance

Authors

Name	Organization	E-mail
Gillis G.	University of York (Great Britain)
Barta P.	University of York (Great Britain)
Leblanc R.	University of York (Great Britain)

Всего: 3

References

Where were the Directors: Guidelines for Im proved Corporate Governance in Canada. 1994. The Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada: Toronto.

Westphal J.D. 2002. Second thoughts on board performance: Why do so many demand board independence when it does so little good. The Corporate Board 23 (136): 6-10.

Taylor J. 1987. Storming the Magic King dom. Knopf: N. Y.

The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Accounting Reportins. 1987. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations. Washington, D. C.

Romano R. 2005. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. The Yale Law Journal 114 (7): 1521-1611.

Lorsch J.W., MacIver E. 1989. Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Cor porate Boards. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, MA.

Robbins L. [1932] 1984. An Essay on The Nature and Significance of Economic Sci ence. 3rd ed. New York University Press: N. Y.

Leighton D., Thain D. 1997. Making Boards Work: What Directors Must Do to Make Canadian Boards Effective. McGraw-Hill Ryerson: Toronto.

Leblanc R. 2003. Boards of Directors: An Inside View. Faculty of Graduate Studies, York University: Toronto.

Leblanc R., Gillies J. 2005. Inside the Board room: How Boards Really Work and the Coming Revolution in Corporate Gover nance. Wiley: Toronto.

Lampert H. 1983. Til Death do us Part: Ben dix vs. Martin Marietta. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.: N. Y.

Lawler E., Finegold D.L. 2005. The changing face of corporate boards. MIT Sloan Man agement Review 46 (2): 67-70.

Jensen M.C. 1986. The agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (2): 323- 329.

Harris I.C., Shimizu K. 2004. Too busy to serve? An examination of the influence of over boarded directors. Journal of Man agement Studies 41 (5): 775-798.

Jensen M.C. 1979. Eclipse of the public corporation. Harvard Business Review 67 (5): 61-74.

Fleischer A.J. Jr., Haz G.G., Kippler M.Z. 1985. Board Games: The Changing Shape of Corporate Power. Little Brown and Company: Boston, MA.

Friedman M. 1970. The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine (13 September).

Gillies J. 1992. Boardroom Renaissance: Power, Morality and Performance in the Modern Corporation. McGraw-Hill Ryerson: Toronto.

Ferris S.P., Jagannathan M., Pritchard A.C. 2005. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance 58 (3): 1087-1111.

Finkelstein S., Mooney A. C. 2003. Not the usual suspects: How to use board process to make boards better. Academy of Man agement Executive 17 (2): 101-113.

Drucker P. 1976. The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America. Harpers and Row: N. Y.

Eichenwald K. 2005. Conspiracy of Fools. Broadway Books: N. Y.

Dalton C., Dalton D. 2005. Boards of directors: Utilising empirical evidence in developing practical prescriptions. British Journal of Management 16 (Supplement 1): 91-97.

Deutsch Y. 2005. The impact of board composition on firms' critical decisions: A metaanalytical review. Journal of Management 31 (3): 424-444.

Comey J. B. 2004. Lessons Learned from Re cent Corporate Debacles. Paper Presented at the 2004 Annual Corporate Governance Conference of the National Association of Corporate Directors, Washington, D. C., October 18, 2004.

Creswell J. W. 1994. Research Design: Qual itative and Quantitative Approaches. SAGE Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.

Burrough B., Helyar J. 1990. Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco. Harper and Row: N. Y.

Cadbury, Sir Adrian. [1933] 1993. Highlights of the proposals of the Committee on financial aspects of corporate governance. In: Prentice D. D., Holland P. R. J. (eds.).

Contemporary Issues in Corporate Gover nance. Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Bruck C. 1988. The Predators Ball. Simon and Schuster: N. Y.

BerleA., Means G. 1932. The Modern Corpo ration and Private Property. MacMillan: N.Y.

Bhagat S., Black B. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long term board performance. Journal of Corpo ration Law 27 (2): 231-273.

Amoako-Adu B, Smith B.F. 1995. Outside financial directors and corporate governance. In: Daniels R. J., Mork R. (eds.). Corporate Decision Making in Canada. University of Calgary Press: Calgary; 401- 420.