Epistemic inquiry in Platos Meno

Leaving aside the traditionallogical discussion, we examined "Meno" in relation to the key concept of this dialogue - inquiry(zetesis) of the knowledge, and of the role which the epistemic inquiry play for Plato's doctrine ingeneral, for his theory of Forms and how to understand anamnesis. In this article we focused on Plato'sepistemic inquiry account, what elements it is composed, and we briefly reviewed the significance ofthe theory of definition, elenchos and aporia (paradox) in Plato as the elements of the philosophicalinquiry. We didn't discuss the Meno's paradox in logical terms, but we did it as two possiblealternatives for the inquiry: whether to seek what is already known (Z1) or seek that can't be known atall (Z2). In this article we argued that Socrates didn't imply and provide a logical solution of theparadox, but considered it as an element of inquiry and proved his choice in favor of Z2. We believedthat it is possible to reconstruct two theses that leaded Socrates to their own final formulation of theparadox. These two theses allowed us to demonstrate that Meno's paradox applied not only to cases ofabsolute ignorance, but also to intelligible and quite explicit objects of the phenomenal world. Firstthesis: If we do not know something specific (F), how do we know how to accomplish this. Thesecond thesis: It is impossible get to learn what is the part of particular thing (F), not knowing what isthat very thing. In inspecting of the second thesis we discussed the existential (inquiry of what-is, ti)and predicational (inquiry of predicates, things like this, hopoion) inquiry, associated with the Socraticdecision of two different projects: "looking to" Forms and finding definitions. Further in article weargued that Socrates hadn't offer a logical solution of the Meno's paradox. Moreover Plato introducedthe aporia in his dialogues like the element of the inquiry consists of the some components: elenchos,aporia, and anamnesis. Sharing the G. Vlastos's concept of elenchos, we drew attention to the fact thatit was not a refutation in its pure form, but it should be understand as an argument or proof. So thefeature of elenchos would be an inquiry through a series of questions from Socrates and of answersfrom the interlocutor. Often this kind of inquiry could result as aporia and thus is given the directionfor a new inquiry. It is usually assumed that the aporia in Plato cannot be considered as part of apositive inquiry. In this article followed by V. Politis we distinguished cathartic and zetetic aporia. Webelieved that in addition to some of the cathartic function same of aporia has also zetetic functions,Meno's paradox relates to this type of aporia. In the case of Meno's paradox Socrates modeled theinquiry as unknown or partially known inquiry through his famous doctrine of recollection, we arguedthat it was one of the steps in Plato's epistemic inquiry. Of the two possible interpretations ofanamnesis - rational or mythical - we choose the first, understanding anamnesis as a metaphor, asanother Platonic myth, beyond which lies a practical experiment and learning. Anamnesis then was onemore component of epistemic inquiry.

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