The problem of inquiry in Aristotle

The article raises the question of inquiry methods in Aristotle. It examines different types of inquiry: empirical, endoxical, practical, theoretical, poetical, dialectical, epistemic, ethical, philosophical. Attempt to unify the Aristotle's inquiry account leads us to formulate two problems: the problem of correlation and the problem of coordination. The first problem describes the coordination of practical and theoretical reason with the practical and the theoretical inquiry, as well as the sphere of application of practical and theoretical inquiry. The second problem sets one to one correspondence of endoxical, dialectic, ethical, philosophical inquiries both among themselves and correspondence of each of these types of inquiry to the theoretical or practical inquiry. Further, the paper analyzes the idea of inquiry in Aristotle within the context of the inquiry in the former philosophy's doctrines, namely in the context of the Meno's paradox: whether to seek what is already known (Z1) or seek that can't be known at all (Z2). It is shown that the Aristotelian "solution of the paradox" is not strict logical solution, it is similar to the way Plato avoid the problem of this paradox. There is a point of view that Aristotle solved this paradox having used preunderstanding, but this approach gives little as far as preunderstanding raises from phai-nomena it is necessary anyway to prove truth of this preunderstanding. In general, in his response to the paradox Aristotle admitted the principle of inquiry the whole by its parts despite that difficulties which that principle implies. In Aristotle's doctrine there is an important clarification to the understanding of the inquiry: any inquiry is possible only where there is no episteme, and the episteme is the final result of all inquiries. In the relation to the episteme Aristotle actually rethought Meno's paradox: as a necessary move from Z2 to Z1 - from lack of knowledge to the absolute one. And if the first premise of the paradox - the unknown cannot be found - is discarded completely and it is postulated the need for such an inquiry, the second premise in Aristotle fundamentally reviewed in comparison with the previous tradition, and it is used in the following way - absolute knowledge is obtainable and if we have achieved absolute knowledge, the inquiry stops,. As a result, we admitted that the highest status in the Aristotle's doctrine had the epistemic inquiry as the inquiry for absolute knowledge.

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