On the Problem of the Unity of "Affect" and "Intellect" in Activity Psychology (In the Continuation of the Discussion)

This text is a response to the article written by A.D. Maidansky (Siberian Journal of Psychology. 2020. 76) [2] and aims to update the discussion of controversial aspects of cultural and activity psychology, especially some of the provisions of the activity theory by A.N. Leontiev and his scientific school, which, in contrast to the creative heritage of L.S. Vygotsky, are now rarely considered in both foreign and domestic literature. The article analyses the solution of the problem of correlation between "affect" (motivational and emotional component of mental life) and "intellect" (cognitive processes) in this scientific school. It is shown that the definition of the mind as an orienting activity (A.N. Leontiev, P.Ya. Galperin, etc.) does not imply the reduction of mental processes to cognitive ones, since any orienting process is always affectively loaded. Sensations are not separated from affects already in the primary forms of sensitivity that arise in phylogeny. However, even at later stages of mental development, a similar unity is maintained, although the mental life (including emotional states) becomes more differentiated. It is shown that this unity of the subject's knowledge of the object and the subject's attitude to this object is best represented in A.N. Leontiev's scientific school in the definition of mental phenomena through the category of sense. Since affect (emotion in the broad sense of the word) is a subjective form of motivation, the problem of "mastering affects" is transformed in the school of A.N. Leontiev into the problem of awareness (comprehension) of the motives of a person's activity and possible restructuring of the hierarchy of motives, which is best represented in the situation of an act. The act as a responsible and free action of a personality is performed by choosing one of the meaningful motives, which acquires a new sense (and thus an additional motivating force) due to the inclusion of this motive in a higher system of values, in the limit - in universal values. And since, according to Leontiev's scientific school, in the activity of any person the "motivational-emotional" ("affect") and cognitive ("intellect") components are inseparable, they are usually proportional to each other: the higher forms of emotional regulation, overcoming the lower ones, correspond with the higher forms of knowledge of the world as a whole. The author sees a clear parallel of these ideas with B. Spinoza's arguments about "Amor Dei intellectualis". Thus, the formula of B. Spinoza - L. S. Vygotsky about free will as a reasonable mastery of affects discussed in the article by A. D. Maidansky is clarified and filled with concrete psychological content.

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