On some features of the conceptual frameworks of simulacrum

The article considers the modelling problems of conceptual frameworks. One and the same theory, undergoing some external changes in relation to its perception and interpretation on the strength of changing the pragmatic presuppositions of the subject of knowledge, demonstrates the reality of the absence of framework criterion for us, which would be able to actualize the definition of the concept "irrational". Ontology of discourse is defined with conceptual framework by the representation of concrete concepts. The bases of simulacrum as a discursive formation are predetermined by the possible variability of concepts interpretation and, of course, the change of their meanings necessarily leads to the fact that automatically we will eventually get a certain set of simulacrum. The concept is set by a number of concrete meanings and values, change of which involves reconstitution of the discourse. The picture of the studied reality can both include / allow the possible sets of values - meanings vital for its concepts, and not include / allow them. The conceptual framework of a theoretical system is in strict accordance with the already happened "progressive shift'' of problems only as long as this shift is perceived as progressive. The bases of ''progressiveness'' of shifting problems are rationally indeterminable because of the impossibility of finding points, which clearly fix the initial moment of inadequacy of our expectation in relation to the already existing theoretical systems (like to the description of world pattern). The following situation is also formulated: the creation of conceptual frameworks is caused by the system of their internal ordering both due to availability and intersubjectivity, and by means of presuppositions that predetermine both the availability and intersubjectivity of this discourse. Hereby, by analysing and comparing the principles and stages of making the conceptual frameworks from the point of view of simulacrum formation, we came to the following conclusion: first, simulacrum, as a certain form, is undoubtedly impossible outside the conceptual framework; secondly, conceptual changes, which are, in fact, a permanent status of our view formation, are possible only within a concrete conceptual discourse; and, thirdly, metaphysical principles of theoretical (and non-theoretical) models indicate the impossibility of identification of rational relations between these principles and their representation, for these relations do not exist.

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