The problem of the subject of moral competence: the nature of moral identity as the basis of decision-making

Nowadays the situation in ethics is often characterized as moral pluralism. The absence of criteria in determining the notion "good" leads to the assertion of elimination of any appeals to the objective and transpersonal standards from ethics. Our assumption is that any conversation about morality and virtue search criteria should start by identifying the subject of moral competence. Moreover, consideration of forms of identity and the conditions of its construction will help to establish key points in respect to the criteria of moral action. It is assumed that identity and its basic settings are directly dependent on the intersubjective discursive practices in the field of social interaction. In this case, appeal to the narrative component of personal and collective identity could set the direction for the approach to the subject of moral action. The interpretation of a rational, intelligent action proposed by the "decision theory" and consequentialism works perfectly in the economic space, but it is not really suitable for the resolution of questions of morality. The article states a position which is not new. It is about placing the individual in the context of a story or a narrative, in which we can interpret his/her action as moral, not moral, or immoral, for instance. The position of R.M. Hare is considered. He refers to the lifeworld and the images of the "justifying" and "telling" ego. By this he seems to completely devalue the everyday world. Again, we deal with seemingly actors functioning separately, with their principles and attitudes, with their way of life. Following is the position by P.F. Strawson. The existing general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society. As a whole, it neither calls for, nor permits, an external 'rational' justification. Strawson appeals to everyday moral intuitions. In this case, the personal sense of the reaction (conscience, guilt, remorse) refer to the impersonal criteria of standards and regulations assessment. Further, our hypothesis is that moral reasoning and interpretation of actions attributed to the responsible subject can be regarded as a successful and true or regulatorily right only when it refers to the level of communication of the lifeworld. This is the level at which before all reflection, forms of identity appear oriented to the "Other". It is the level of interactions on which participants agree on coordinating their plans and actions based on the inter-subjective understanding and acceptance. In order to clarify the phenomenon of communicativity and intersubjectivity we should turn to discussion of these concepts within the framework of "discourse ethics" by J. Habermas and K.-O. Apel. We do not insist that the subject is originally given to us as a moral subject . It is rather an opportunity to talk about morality as such that is to assume a different concept of the subject of responsibility. The structure of the subject's being itself includes Others on the pre-reflective and thus pre-moral level. This structure (which, in terms of Apel, could be called transcendental) implies the existence of such initial conditions of existence that we can not treat the subject as isolated and autonomous.

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