US policy towards European integration under presidency of L. Johnson

As former Vice-President Lyndon Johnson had inherited Kennedy's European policy, the so-called Grand Design aimed at the establishment of 'partnership of equals' between the US and uniting Europe. The main components of the Grand Design were the creation of the Multilateral Nuclear Force, the supporting of Great Britain joining the Common Market and trade negotiations with the EEC in the GATT. Johnson's Administration continued Kennedy's European policy. Nevertheless, by the end of 1964, the new administration had abandoned some exaggerated and unrealistic expectations of the Grand Design about the Multilateral Nuclear Force and profit deal with the EEC in the trade of agricultural products. In conducting their policy towards European integration, Johnson's Administration pursued the following method: the US should not give the impression of intervening into Europe's affairs. The pivotal moment came in 1965-1966 with the escalation of the Vietnam War and de Gaulle's dual attack against the EEC and NATO. The 'empty chair' crisis paralyzed negotiations in GATT for half a year. The US State Department considered the 'empty chair' crisis as the EEC internal matter and avoided any comments about it. American officials were disappointed with the delay in the Kennedy Round, but did not accept it as a failure of negotiations. However, American politicians were disturbed by de Gaulle's parallel actions towards the EEC and NATO and the influence of the NATO crisis on the development of the EEC. After a hard bargaining with the EEC in 1967, the Kennedy Round was completed successfully. For the first time from the end of World War II, the US and the EEC negotiated as equal economic powers. After the completion of the Kennedy Round, it was expected that industrial tariffs would be reduced by 35-36 %, which was the best result in the history of GATT. At the same time, there were very modest achievements in the sphere of agriculture. In 1967, Great Britain made its second application to join the Common Market. Johnson's administration supported the new British application, but in comparison with the first British attempt to join the EEC, it avoided demonstrating its attitude and exerting pressure on the European states on that issue. At the end of 1967, France blocked Great Britain's entry into the EEC once again. In spite of the Vietnam War, Johnson completed the main Kennedy's initiatives for Europe and took strong measures to overcome crisis in NATO, coursed by the policy of de Gaulle. However, by the end of 1960s, a gap between American expectations from the European integration process and its real achievements became obvious. Americans were disappointed by the slow progress of European integration, especially in the political sphere. Some American officials also asked whether it was wise to support the policy of Europeans states if this policy contradicted American national interests. These questions and disappointments contributed to the rethinking of the US policy towards uniting Europe during the Nixon period.

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