Definition in analytical legal philosophy: P. Hacker versus H. Hart

The article deals with the study of the problem of the definability of fundamental legal concepts, in particular, and the evaluation of the place of the theory of definition in modern jurisprudence, as a whole. The critical arguments of Peter Hacker against the dominant in analytical legal philosophy approach to the definition of the legal concepts of Herbert Hart are presented and analyzed. In his article "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" Herbert Hart revived Bentham's arguments with respect to the definition of a legal term 'claim-right'. He believed that the traditional mode of definition (per genus et differentiam) is poorly adapted to law. From the point of view of method, Hart does not use paraphrasis as Bentham did, but introduces a truth-conditional definition. Like Bentham, Hart defines not a word in isolation, but a sentence in which a puzzling normative predicate appears. He defines it by enumerating the conditions under which such a sentence (or sentential formula such as 'X has a right') would be true. He introduces a new method of defining legal concepts - "explanatory elucidation". However, a replacement of the analytical definition by a truth-conditional definition turned out to be non-controversial. Quite interesting and original criticism in this case was made by Peter Hacker who argues that both Bentham's position and Hart's arguments against the definition of per genus et differentiam are invalid, since there is no reason to think that paraphrastic definition or truth-conditional definition are uniquely suited to the definition of fundamental legal or normative concepts. The interest in the analysis of Hacker's position is explained not only by the fact that he puts forward very sophisticated counterarguments, but primarily by the fact that he seeks to challenge the assertion that the Hart method is almost the only one suitable for legal concepts. In his opinion, Hart's views are, like Bentham's, open to substantial criticisms. Thus, the rejection of analytical definition in favor of contextual definitions by Bentham and explanatory elucidations by Hart is premature and not justified.

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