China's policy in the Arctic Council

This paper aims to study the participation of the People's Republic of China in the Arctic Council. This international intergovernmental organization has already become an essential structure for decision-making in the Arctic region. China entered the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013, despite being a non-Arctic state. The approval of Beijing's bid was a result of the realization of a long-term strategy, designed by the PRC in order to acquire the access to Arctic governance. The steps of this strategy are traced in the paper, too, as the authors analyze what methods China used to gain the favor of Arctic states - the Council permanent members: primarily Denmark, Iceland and Russia and, later, Sweden, Canada and Finland. The research is based on the study of a large number of sources: China's official declarations, publications of Chinese experts, multilateral documents of the Arctic Council, bilateral documents, official reports, as well as the up-to-date media sources of China and of the Council members it interacts with in the most intensive way. The paper demonstrates how trade and investment deals, along with the inclusion of specific formulations in bilateral agreements, helped the PRC to advance towards its goals in the Arctic. These goals for China primarily include the access to natural resources of the Arctic shelf and the use of the Northern Sea Route for cheaper and faster goods supplies to Europe. At the same time, the open declaration of these goals can be attributed only to the present stage of China's policy, while at earlier stages Beijing in some way disguised its objectives by emphasizing the need for environmental cooperation and joint research as the top priorities of its Arctic policy, and promoted its own probable participation in these activities. Having acquired the observer status, China has intensified its Arctic policy considerably by expanding comprehensive Arctic-related research projects, organizing new expeditions and strengthening bilateral ties with Russia and other Arctic states. Meanwhile, this situation can result in various problems of regional and global scale. The fact that China, with its intensive Arctic policy, and several other non-Arctic states have obtained the Council observer status, can act as a precedent, used by non-Arctic states with powerful economies all over the world, or as a ground for complicated disputes and conflict for the probable future exploitation of the resources of the Arctic. The latter may start even earlier, for example, thanks to Russian-Chinese oil or gas deals, which can expose the region to environmental risks. And some conflicts have already started to occur in bilateral relations: China, despite being a non-Arctic state, started pressurizing Russia to provide special privileges for shipping by the Northern Sea Route.

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