From peace process to war on terror: the Middle East policy of the European Union in 1995-2003

The article investigates the policy of the leading countries of the European Union in the Middle East in 1995-2003. In this period, the EU made efforts to establish close relations with the countries of the region to become more involved in the Middle East peace process. Interest in this was due to the excessive remoteness of the EU from the events in the region: while the United States concentrated the leadership in the Middle East settlement in their hands, the EU was forced to confine to the material and financial support of the conflicting parties. The peace process prevented the difficult situation prevailing there after the Kuwait crisis. Sanctions imposed on Iraq contributed to its isolation, but it was not enough to exit the crisis. Moreover, the participants of the anti-Iraq coalition had major differences in the methods of solving the Iraqi problem. The situation in the region deteriorated significantly as a result of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001. After the tragedy, Washington announced the beginning of the war against international terrorism, the main targets of which were the defeat of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The war in Iraq put to test the US relations with the countries of the European Union. It primarily concerned France and Germany which opposed the use of force against Iraq as it damaged their economic interests in the Persian Gulf. But in general, this opposition did not reflect on the high level of relations of these countries with the United States: ultimately, the centripetal tendencies within NATO were much stronger than the differences between members of the Alliance. The Iraqi crisis showed that the EU was dominated by supporters of a closer union with the United States, and in these conditions there was no hope that the EU would give preference to the French idea of a unified Europe, not to the American project of the transatlantic bloc. During the crisis around Iraq the axis Paris-Berlin generally proved its effectiveness, but it failed to put forward a program to promote the peace process. The analysis of the situation in the region showed that the problem of settlement remained unresolved. There was no progress in important issues such as Israeli settlements, final borders, the status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee problem. After the terrorist attacks in the US, the influence of political Islam in the Arab world increased, but Washington responded to it inappropriately: it sought to undermine the situation in the Middle East under the pretext of planting the "values of American democracy" there. As a result, the region established the situation of "neither war nor peace": the Palestinians felt it to be harmed, and Israel was in no hurry to complete the negotiations. This situation led to stagnation in the settlement process, postponing the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

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