Application of Walter Edelberg's Perspectivalist Semantics in the Methodology of the History of Philosophy. Part II: Types of Term Meanings

In this paper, the author proposes a way to break the deadlock that has arisen in the dispute between historicists (contextualists) and appropriationists about the methodology of the history of philosophy. The author shows that one of the reasons for the dispute is that the proponents of both camps differ in their answers to the question: Is the application of the concepts of past philosophers in contemporary discussions possible? There are powerful arguments for the difference of the objects of ancient philosophers from the objects discussed by modern ones, and for the necessity of the study of the application of ancient objects in modern discussions. The author shows that one of the reasons for the collision is the difference in answers given in these two carnps to the question of the possibility of application of the concepts and conceptions of past philosophers in conternporary discussions. The author presents these differences in a forrn suitable for subsequent forrnalization by rneans of Walter Ed elberg's perspectivalist semantics. As shown, the two opposing positions can be treated in such a way (based on Edelberg's perspectivalist semantics) that these positions are corn-pletely cornpatible. The author believes this can stop the recurring disputes between the two carnps and lead the discussion to a new, rnore thoughtful level. Moreover, this approach preserves the powerful argurnents cited by both carnps in favor of their own positions, which would be very problernatic to discard. In order to irnplernent this approach, the author answers the questions: "In what sense the difference of objects in different belief systerns does not prevent these objects frorn their involvernent in up-to-date discussions?", "What is the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the term in a philosophical text?". The author also determines the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an analogue of an object frorn the belief systern of one philosopher in the belief systern of another philosopher. In order to achieve the am, the author proposes to treat historicists and contextualists as accepting the first Edelberg's thesis that there are no identical objects in two different belief systems, and to treat appropriati onists as accepting the second Edelberg's thesis that an object frorn one belief systern can have an analogue in another belief systern. The author shows that if to take Edelberg's approach objects from the beliefs of an ancient philosopher can be used in the beliefs of a rnodern philosopher or a historian of philosophy. However, current beliefs do not use the ancient philosophers' object itself, but its "counte r-part". Because of this, ancient philosophers are not attributed modernized concepts, which they did not adhere to and could n ot adhere to: this is the point of accusation that historicists and contextualists rnake against appropriationists. So, this approach offers the semantics such that belief reports of ancient philosophers' are no longer problematic ones, unlike the historicists and contextualists' approach within which such reports are still problernatic ones.

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