The limits of applicability of a genus-differentia definition in legal language

The article presents a careful analysis of a genus-differentia definition (Definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specifi-cam in the original Latin), that is a definition by means of the genus (the kind or family of a thing to which the defined thing belongs), and the differentia (the distinguishing feature that marks it off from other members of the same family), and the limits of its applicability in legal language. Commonly, this definition is understood as a kind of a taxonomical description by which a thing is assigned a certain universal genus that is further differentiated by its unique, specific characteristics. In this paper, the author suggests that even though this type of definition has become widespread in legal practice and legal theory, there are reasons to believe that it is not universal in the sense of de res, nor in the sense of de terminus. The author proposes a reformation of the classical approach to the definition of legal concepts due to the continuing questions about the universality of the classical method of definition per genus proximum et differentiam specificam in relation to them. Indeed, genus and differentia have primary importance to the definition of terms. Defining a term is a completely different procedure than giving the essence of a thing. But the issue is not about the reality or nominality of the definitions in that case. The proposed research rests on a thesis that the main problem is the structure of the definition itself. This implies a review of the effectiveness of the use in a legal language of the classical definition per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. Therefore, the author tries to answer the main (or basic) question for the purposes of his project: To what extent the outline of genus and differentia is essential to definitions in general, and to definitions of legal concepts in particular? The author carefully considers main arguments against and for this question. What is the difference between logical and legal views on a genus-differentia definition? A careful analysis of applicability of a genus-differentia definition in legal language would allow avoiding common logical and linguistic fallacies related to the semantics and syntax of expressions of legal language. Additionally, the author proves that the applicability of a genus-differentia definition is limited by its own subject, i.e. it could be applicable only to the concepts that are used in different branches of the legal system, but not to the fundamental legal concepts that are used primarily in the constitutional law, because they do not have a superior genus. This is a key-point of the author's research.

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