Evil Law as the Pure Law: Critical Remarks on the Philosophy of Law of H.L.A. Hart
The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and morality. According to legal positivism, morality is not a criterion of the legitimacy for legal norms. The law can have any content including absolutely immoral (the so-called "separability thesis"). Law issues are not connected with discussing the moral merits of a possible judicial decision. They are only closely related to studying various purely legal phenomena like precedents, judicial discretion, legislatures, etc. The ascriptive legal statements theory proposed by the Oxford School of Law (Herbert Hart, Joseph Raz, and others) serves as the core of contemporary legal positivism. This theory is based on the notion of defeasibility for legal responsibility without any moral reasoning. There, phenomena of law are interpreted as purely linguistic, not social constructions. Analysis of pure law language should provide all the needful tools to extract hidden meaning from any legal norm. This analysis does not require going beyond the legal language since it does not describe any real situations in the world, but merely expresses legal requirements, allowing to legally qualify some observed events. It completely eliminates any references to moral principles from the analysis of legal language. However the critical reconstruction theory of ascriptive legal statements shows limitations of the legal positivism's analytical approach to the phenomena of law. The example of a fictitious legal collision offered demonstrates limitations of the legal positivism approach to the understanding of law phenomena. This collision is a complex conceptual mix of Frankfurt-style examples and imaginary situations in the Trolley Problem widely known in analytical ethics. It clearly demonstrates the possible paradox of a law judgment in situations where conditions for the recognition and cancellation of legal liability are the property of two different (not necessarily openly contradictory) legal norms. It can serve as a strong argument in favor of contemporary theories of natural law (Lon Fuller, John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin, and others), which questioned the possibility of creating a theory of pure law. They considered it senseless and impossible to draw any strict border between moral and legal norms. Immoral law cannot have the particular property of creating a moral obligation to follow such like a law. Law cannot be built on legality only, and the answers to all significant legal questions should be found in moral theories.
Keywords
юридический позитивизм,
теория естественных прав,
теория чистого права,
тезис об отделимости,
отменяемость,
ответственность,
моральная аргументация,
legal positivism,
natural law theory,
pure theory of law,
separability thesis,
defeasibility,
responsibility,
moral reasoningAuthors
| Nekhaev Andrei V. | Tyumen State University; Omsk State Technical University | A_V_Nehaev@rambler.ru |
Всего: 1
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