Tank Production in the Context of the USSR Military-Economic Strategy in the 1930s.

This article analyzes the general aspects of the USSR economy militarization within the context of the military-economic strategy of the Soviet political establishment during the 1930s. The aim of the article is to identify the role and importance of military production assimilation at civilian plants using conveyor methods of production in the political and economic theory and practice of the Soviet Union of the pre-war years. The study combines the methods of intellectual history, historical analysis and synthesis. It is based on an analysis of the ideological premises of the Soviet political and intellectual elites, the processes of introducing new techniques for the production of armored vehicles, and the quantitative indicators of the USSR tank industry of the 1930s. The Soviet political elite believed in the inevitability of the new World War, at the same time recognizing the fact of the USSR's isolation and taking activities to delay the confrontation. Meanwhile, the Soviet military elite, from M.V. Frunze to M.N. Tukhachevsky, considered the military might of a nation to be a direct projection of its economic might. Stalin's theory of "building socialism in a single country" by means of an accelerated industrialization was based on the creation of an "American"-type giant plants of flow-conveyor production of consumer goods ("Fordism"), combined with the economic development of the eastern regions. The Soviet leaders sought to reduce the pressure of the army's requirements on the economy, assimilating military production at the newly created plants. The exemplary case of this strategy is seen in the tank industry. The "tankization" of the Red Army, which became an integral part of the ambitious Soviet military doctrine of the early 1930s, faced numerous difficulties (quality of armor, transmission, tracks, diesel engines). The Soviet tank industry was relatively successful in fulfilling the peace-time plans, but in the case of possible mobilization it remained a matter of concern for the leaders of the state: the defense planning suggested a sharp increase of production in the wartime, relying upon the assimilated newly-built civilian factories with conveyor lines. Evacuation of defense industry in the desperate conditions of Hitler's aggression and the subsequent development of massive tank production by the factories of the Ural region determined the course of World War II, but the authors emphasize that the winning strategy was not "programmed": the evacuation led to the severe loss of quality of tank production. Nonetheless, the key to success was to be found within the framework of the "Fordist" strategy of assimilating military production with the civilian one, which demonstrated prominent efficiency in the organization of tank industry. The conclusion is that, in the long term, it was the strategy chosen at the dawn of Soviet industrialization which allowed the USSR and the Allies to inflict a crushing defeat on the aggressor.

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