The Western Model of Settling the Afghan Conflict: The Rise and Fall of the “Bonn Track” (2001-2014)

The article discusses the evolution of the Western model of settling the Afghan conflict in the period from 2001 to 2014. On the basis of the case-study method, the authors analyse the international community's main goals and objectives in the settlement of the Afghan conflict. Through the lens of documents of international conferences on Afghanistan, the development stages, participants' motives, contradictions and constraints in the development of the Afghan diplomatic process are highlighted. The path from the romantic-idealistic to the pragmatic-realistic approach in resolving the Afghan conflict by the international coalition is traced. The authors come to the following conclusions during the study. First, there was an application of the “western model” of state building in Afghanistan at the first “romantic” stage from 2001 to 2006. However, ignoring the specifics of the country of Afghanistan helped create only a visibility of democratic institutions and of the rule of law. The emphasis on forceful methods of resolving the Afghan conflict excluded influential social actors from the political process. At the same time, it was not possible to create a combat-ready national army of Afghanistan, and maintaining security in the country became the responsibility of the international military. This situation discredited the new authorities of Afghanistan. Second, there was an attempt to ensure sustainable economic development as the basis for the reconstruction of Afghanistan at the second “transitional” stage from 2006 to 2009. However, the asymmetry in favor of military spending, the bureaucratic nature of economic assistance mechanisms, and the conniving attitude to financial control mechanisms failed to reverse the negative trends in the country's socioeconomic development. The high intensity of clashes nullified the minimum achievements of socioeconomic development. Moreover, the increase in losses among international military contingents, the reputation losses of the newly created democratic institutions forced the international community to qualitatively review approaches to the Afghan diplomatic process. Third, the international community embarked on an honorary exit from Afghanistan at the third “pragmatic” stage from 2009 to 2014. The stake was made on a gradual transit of responsibility from the international coalition to the leadership of Afghanistan while keeping the image of international structures. The self-reliance of Afghanistan was becoming the main ideological pattern of this stage. Planning horizons of the Afghan conflict were shifted for an indefinite 2024. The international financial obligations became a kind of pay for distancing Afghan peacebuilding. However, international financial assistance remains a significant way of financial flow into the country and is an important factor in maintaining power in Kabul. The Afghan peace process, as a collective security project of the international community, began to break up into individual national initiatives by global actors.

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