On the Failed Preventive War of Marshal Pilsudski Against Germany in 1933

The article discusses the problem of the so-called preventive war, with the threat of which Marshal Pilsudski blackmailed Chancellor Hitler in the spring and autumn of 1933. The author of the article aims (1) to conduct a discussion with foreign historiography, primarily Polish, that is mostly inclined to deny Pilsudski's readiness to use force; (2) within the framework of this discussion, to put forward a hypothesis that the reason for Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations in October 1933, as well as the subsequent sudden proposal of Hitler to conclude non-aggression pacts to France and Czechoslovakia, was the disclosure, shortly before these events, in Berlin of a Polish spy network that had stolen the German mobilization plan; (3) to show that a kind of an overarching goal of Pilsudski's blackmail was to push Berlin onto the path of negotiations on including Poland in the legal field of the Fuhrer's “eastern” plans, outlined by the so-called behind-the-scenes Locarno strategists. The marshal's use of the line of force was of a phased and schematic nature: one can consider the adventures with the destroyer Whirlwind and the landing on Westerplatt as a kind of a preliminary test of strength that brought the first fruits - concessions from the great powers. After the publication in December 1932 of the so-called “pact of five powers” and the subsequent decision of Pilsudski on rapprochement with Germany, this line - the concept of conducting a preventive war - was shaped and strengthened. One can consider the publication of the draft Pact of Four as a trigger for implementing the line. In the spring and autumn of 1933, the line was enforced in several stages, which had a pronounced schematic character: 1) a demonstrative proposal to France to conduct a preventive war, 2) a demonstrative saber-rattling, 3) demonstrative veiled overtures with Moscow, 4) presentation of an ultimatum to Berlin. In the course of the study, the author identified and substantiated an episode completely ignored by Polish experts on this problem - the disclosure in the autumn of 1933 of a Polish spy network in Berlin that stole the German mobilization plan. This provoked an emotional reaction from Hitler, who withdrew Germany from the League of Nations and offered non-aggression pacts to France and Czechoslovakia. However, the Fuhrer did not manage to break out of the marshal's tenacious grip - using the well-known four-way scheme, the latter managed to include Poland in the eastern plans of the former by concluding the Lipsky-Neurath declaration of January 26 and the secret Hitler-Pilsudski treaty of February 25, 1934. The secret cooperation between Warsaw and Berlin in the field of preparing an attack on the USSR, which, according to the marshal, should have led to the re-creation of Greater Poland at the expense of the partition of Russia, continued throughout 1934, with the Japanese military taking an active part in it.

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