Vladivostok railway junction and the Lend-Lease Pacific corridor (1941–1945)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the functioning of the Vladivostok railway junction, a key link in the logistics system of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which ensured the reception and dispatch of strategic cargoes supplied by the Allies under the Lend-Lease program. The purpose of the study is to reveal the complex problems faced by the Vladivostok Commercial Port and the Primorsky Railway, as well as to evaluate the effectiveness of measures aimed at overcoming crisis phenomena under extreme stress. The work was based on archival materials, including documents from the central state archives, as well as regional ones, primarily the Primorsky Krai State Archive (GAPK); reports from the People's Commissariats, resolutions of the State Defense Committee, and departmental records, which made it possible to reconstruct the dynamics of cargo turnover, identify system limitations, and analyze management decisions. The research focuses on the contradiction between the growing volumes of lend-Lease supplies and the limited capabilities of the transport infrastructure of the Far East. The author shows that since 1942, the port has faced a chronic shortage of railway wagons (30-50% of the demand), overloaded warehouses and berths, as well as a shortage of qualified personnel. Peak loads, which reached 14-15 thousand tons of cargo per day in 1945, were aggravated by the geographical isolation of the region, the underdevelopment of the logistical base and seasonal restrictions on navigation in the Pacific Ocean. A key methodological approach involved examining the port and the Primorsky Railway as an integrated system. Despite the introduction of innovative methods, such as rapid “board-to-wagon” unloading and mechanization of up to 88% of operations, their efficacy was undermined by systemic issues: irregular supply of railcars, mismatched rolling stock types, and cargo accumulation at piers. For instance, by 1943, 43.7% of ships experienced downtime due to delayed loading, and by 1945, accumulated cargo required 3.7 times more railcars than the infrastructure could provide. The author highlights the role of state regulation: 17 GKO resolutions in 1943-1945 prescribed the redistribution of wagons between roads, the introduction of strict loading standards (800 wagons/day) and a ban on delay of trains. However, geographical remoteness and the technical backwardness of the infrastructure limited the implementation of these decisions. Special attention is paid to the role of international cooperation. Supplies from the United States not only included military equipment and raw materials but also provided the port with crane mechanisms and wagons in disassembled form, which were assembled in repair shops. This partially compensated for the shortage of resources, but dependence on external supplies highlighted the vulnerability of the system. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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