Benedict Spinoza's teaching and philosophy of existentiay-semantic perspectivism (between transcendence and transgression)

Spinoza's philosophy reveals the radical difference from ontology of transcendentalist type. None is based on the hierarchical order of transcendence, claiming as the supreme being the ever unattainable first principle, in relation to which all things seem secondary emanation in need to fill the gap. Spinoza says substance is immanent, and each mode is the state of a substance rather than a ghostly shadow of the prototype shining in the rays of transcendence or an event of the "thing in itself" closed to our knowledge. One of the most significant moments in this regard is the interpretation of the phenomenon of the body. For Spinoza, the body is not a special substance, but its existence is determined primarily by the nature of communication of its elements - other bodies. If the emphasis shifts from the specific substance of the nature of communication and organization, then it can be concluded that the body is essentially a form of discourse - as discourse is nothing more than a way to organize many disparate elements into something whole, subordinate to one existential-semantic term. Discourse does not only speak, but in the form of the body it also acts, turns to exist on the basis of certain prospects in the material and physical. The nature of mode or discourse is not only the desire to maintain its existence, but also the desire to achieve the maximum degree of perfection, or, equivalently, the maximum degree of power, the highest power of acting on the basis of its existential-semantic perspective. In other words, to assert their existence means to increase the level of discourse and the power of its vision and at the same time to resist other discourses seeking to increase their power. In the discourse-analytic approach of Laclau and Mouffe this situation of clash and confrontation of different discourses is called antagonism - the struggle of different discourses for "creating meaning" or, in our proposed terms, for approving existential-semantic perspective. A way of solving antagonism is hegemony - approval of perspectives of one discourse and subordination of other discourse perspectives to it. For Spinoza, the establishment of such a despotic meta-perspective (civil state) is only a consequence of the inadequacy of our knowledge. There is another meta-perspective that frees people from the power of passions that always entail them in different directions and, as a consequence, collide with each other. This is the meta-perspective of a substance. This ontology is developed not on the basis of the prospects of transcendence with vertical hierarchical relations on the principle of "land-sky'', but comes from the horizontal perspective of the sea, where individual waves are modes of a single substance. Spinoza's conception of substance is the result of transfer of the transcendent in the immanent. This process results in the elimination of hierarchical opposition between two planes of existence (metaphysical theory of two worlds) and the disclosure of the horizon of totality - the universal and comprehensive existential-semantic perspective, in which all other perspectives become intense degrees or, using the Hegelian term, moments. Before Spinoza the transcendent was transferred in the immanent by Nicholas of Cusa and G. Bruno, after - by Hegel. This horizon is intermediate between transcendence and transgression.

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