On philosophical content of the category «principle» in penal executive law

The article considers the ontological basis for the category "principle". Traditional definitions of "principles" as "guiding bases", "basic ideas" which exist in the penal executive literature have no strict semantic boundaries; therefore a researcher interprets them in their own way. As a result, they cannot function as general methodological definitions and "principles" cannot be considered as one of the basic categories that must be treated universally. The author suggests the ontological connection of "principles" with the surrounding world for their universal defining by means of a system of general categories developed by philosophy. The basic dialectical triad of general categories of things, properties and relations may be used at the initial level of understanding the category "principle". Moreover this category has the property of connection with other objects as one always says about principles of some things. The category "thing" is used in philosophy to give a universal definition for any phenomenon or process. Thereupon to define the category "principle" the author suggests separating it from any concrete ontological phenomena and connecting it with thecategory "thing", i.e. "a principle of a thing" will be analysed in the article. Such an approach demands the use of the philosophical triad of things, properties and relations, which belongs to one of the most universal concepts of the system of general categories. The article gives a brief description of the categories. Anything connected with the category "thing" may be understood through the categories "property" and "relation"; therefore an important conclusion is drawn: "a principle of a thing" is either its property, or its relation. The common content of these categories makes the author believe that "a principle of a thing" is its relation. In addition, the author asserts that a system approach may be used to define the category "principle" more precisely.

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