VALUES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SUBJECT-OBJECT OPPOSITION

The aim of this article is to reveal the character of the correlation between the concept value and the principle of the subject-object opposition. The specification of this aim is the following: what are the conditions for this correlation? What is the nature of values, revealing themselves when we value something, i.e. within the subject-object opposition? Is the subject the source of values? How should we understand the loss of essentiality of the subject and values in the western philosophy of 16-19 centuries? This article has the following structure:1..The author states the correlation between the concept value and the principle of the subject-object opposition. The author challenges the thesis: a transcendental subject is the source of value.2.The author analyses Kant's definition of value, reason and will. According to Kant, both the a priori synthesis and the action of the moral legislation as the highest value belong to the level of the essence of reason. Far from being the source of values, reason in Kant's philosophy does not manage an a priori synthesis and the moral legislation. In this sense, a reasonable being is not free and is not a personality.3.The author expounds Gartman's and Scheler's criticism of Kant's transcendental subject. The conclusion is the following: causes of defects of transcendental subject are defined wrongly. Axiologies by Gartman, Scheler and Kant do not reveal the subject as a personality and as a free subject. The subject (its essence and its qualities) in the subject-object opposition is equal to the object. The subject cannot manage its own activities.4.The author formulates the methodological basis of Holy Father's anthropology. It differentiates the essence, the act and the person. This methodology allows defining the difference between animate and inanimate objects, reasonable and unreasonable beings and to substantiate the subject's pretension to be the basis for the cognition as a free personality.5.The author criticizes the scheme of the genesis of the concept value, which is used by modern axiology. The author specifies themeaning of the concept loss of essentiality by the subject and by values. The theoretical loss of essentiality of the subject and valueshas the following ground: philosophers forget the peculiarity of the human essence and its origins. This results in the fact that in modernaxiology values lost their true essentiality. The overcoming of the principle of the subject-object opposition in philosophical theories ofthe 20 c. was not supposed to be the overcoming of the loss of essentiality of the subject and values.6..The author expounds her own view on the character of the correlation of the concept value and the principle of the subject-object opposition. The meaning of the first part of this opposition compelled philosophers to study the subject carefully. The issue about the essence of the value is the issue about the subject's essentiality. What is the arrangement of the subject as the basis? Does this arrangement include aims and values, meanings and guides? What is their nature? These issues give rise to axiology as a theory.7.The author states the scheme of the development of the axiological thought as a system of brief answers to the following questions: what are the essentialities of the value and of the subject?

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