LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FORMAL REALISM

Different kinds of paradoxicality and various interpretations of the foundation of logical paradoxes are considered in the article. The results of this research are important for clarification of logical foundations of formal realism as a new onto-epistemological conception in analytic philosophy andphilosophy of science. Formal realism is built on the basis of criticism of relativistic ways of argumentation in ontology and epistemology. Relativism is estimated as contradictory. Relativistic argumentation in its consequences has a paradoxical situation in thought and language. However, the concept of paradoxicality demands more careful explanation because different kinds of paradoxicality and different interpretations of foundation of logical paradoxes are discovered in the tradition of analytic philosophy (the system of formal realism uses resources of analytic philosophy, first of all). Formal realism poses difficult onto-epistemological questions concerning existence of different kinds of essences and possibility of adequate knowledge of the essences without reply. It does not mean that the questions are estimated as unimportant. It rather means that answering the questions is put off. Formal realism gives a right to consider the matters to further concrete epistemological study. And the heuristic power of formal realism for ontology and epistemology consist in confrontation to antirealism. Formal realism, metaphorically, is research and clearing of space before construction works. It is decision on the foundations of rational philosophy. Formal realism does not reject situations of pluralism, conventions, and pragmatic actions in knowledge processes. Formal realism does not deny the difficulty of the task of attainment of the objective truth and the necessary knowledge. Formal realism simply opposes the most radical antirealist thesis. In accordance with the thesis we must reject the ideal of the objective truth as a regulative principle of knowledge at all. Formal realism asserts that refusal leads thought to a dead end.

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