«Other than Being»: Face in the metaphysics of Emmanuel Levinas. Part I: Features of face

One of the key categories of ethics or metaphysics of the French thinkerEmmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) is the "face" (visage), which is understood, first of all, as a way of being of "the Other" - his/her selfpresentationκαθ' αὐτό. However, the concept of "face" does not become the expression of radical exteriority all at once. The primaryimage of "the other" in the early works of Levinas is rather the "being" itself as the impersonal presence, "there is" (il y a). The face thatis "other than being" appears as a metaphysical antithesis of the ontological fact, which is considered as unconditional evil. The face isalways one of the extreme terms of the ethical relationship that excludes any sort of mediation - as if the appearance of the face, "epiphany"banned the judgment upon "the Other" as an alter ego - by analogy with the subject itself. On the other hand, although the "epiphany"of the face takes place in the world, the face cannot be reduced to the object, visible side or plastic form. The face shatters "theparalysis of form", it is essentially form-less, its "otherness" produces before and apart from any intention of the subject - it does notcorrelate with any transcendental structures and exceeds the order of phenomena as it reveals itself per se. But this "self-revelation"turns out to be some primary expression - speech. It is the speech by means of which "the Other" maintains and produces the absolutenessof his/her appearance that initially opens the space of meaning and sense. The face comes forth as the "source" of language - as theirrelevant and non-contextual significant, as the "absolute sign" - index sui. Levinas also calls the face "a trace of itself". The "trace" -another way of self-appearance of "the other" - according to Levinas, is the basis of sign in general. The "trace" is "the presence of absence",its reference always rests empty, and we shall not find the one who had left it, for his/her past had never been present. It seemsto be a paradox in the context of the opposition of «face» and face-less «presence» (il y a) fundamental for the ethics of Levinas, but the"trace" is somewhat "impersonal" or "neutral" in the face itself (because "illeite" is a characteristic feature of that one who had left the"trace"). It should be noted here that Levinas uses the concept of "neutral" mostly in negative sense, as a designation of some "middleterm" that cuts in the relation "face-to-face" with the absolutely "other" and thus substitutes "the other" for itself. Nonetheless, "neutral",being delivered from its polemic connotations, becomes quite suitable for the face, the features of which are described by Levinasmostly in the apophatic manner. In this case "the trace" makes the face extremely ambiguous. The "epiphany" of the face that allows toavoid considering "the Other" by analogy with the subject, however, throws us into the field of another - ontological - analogy, into thespace of "existence without the world", that makes the metaphysical pretension for ethical transcendence of the ontology endlessly problematic.

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