History of science as a basis for philosophic-methodological models design

In the paper the analysis of science by the historic school representativesis covered. They see the task of the philosophy of science not only in revealing the cognitive factors determining the knowledgegrowth, but also in reconstruction of its actual history. Positivism examined the science in the static condition, beyond the socio-culturalcontext. Postpositivism strived to analyze the dynamics of the scientific knowledge; it reshaped the problem - the task of the philosophyof science is not in knowledge substantiation, but in historical reconstruction of its changes (the historical school representatives) andsociological analysis (sociology of science). Postpositivism assumes that the universal standard of scientific character is impossible todefine; and scientific rationality is assigned not only as logic and correspondence rules abidance interpreting theoretical language tolanguage observation, but is assigned with the cognitive activity system and with value-objective structures of the cognitive activityobject. The program of the empirical substantiation of science was critically analyzed by postpositivism conceptions of philosophy andmethodology of science (Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas Samuel Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin, Paul Karl Feyerabend and others). Despitethe modern criticism of positivism the representatives of postpositivism shape two images of science: objectivistic (Karl Popper,Imre Lakatos, Stephen Toulmin) developing logic-rational analysis of science, and culturological (Thomas Samuel Kuhn, Paul KarlFeyerabend and others) realizing the socio-psychological approach, situational analysis and criticizing the methodologism program. Thepaper gives the basic ideas of Karl Popper's critical rationalism conception - falsificationism, conception of three worlds and conceptionof scientific knowledge objectivity. Thomas Samuel Kuhn's argumentation on the role of socio-psychological factors in scientific dynamics,his conception of the paradigm development of science, as well as the criticism of fundamentalism in the conception of PaulKarl Feyerabend's methodological anarchism are analyzed. The contribution of Imre Lakatos's research programs to the implementationof the science rational reconstruction strategy, development of Stephen Toulmin's scientific rationality conception is provided. Philosophyof science conceptions designed by representatives of history of science school did not only manifest the socio-cultural stipulationof science, but also fixed the limits for methodology as a system of universally binding rules of cognition that initiated the studies in thescience of ontology, particularly, studying the mentality in cognitive science, fostered the development of new cognitive practices, suchas evolutionary epistemology and social constructivism.

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