On correlation of categories guilt and purpose of a crime

Questions of the subjective aspect of a crime traditionally are of great interest for researchers. Despite a large number of worksconcerning this theme most of these questions still do not have a unique solution. The issue of correlation of such categories as guilt andpurpose of a crime particularly requires its further scientific consideration. This research shows that there are two main positions on thisissue formulated in the scientific literature. Supporters of the first one (P.S. Dagel, D.P. Kotov, O.S. Sitkovskaya, Yu.A. Krasikov and others)believe that purpose is structurally included into the content of guilt: it is its component and, thus, it is reflected in the concepts ofcriminal intent and negligence. Their opponents (A.I. Rarog, O.S. Kapinus, G.F. Tselnicker and others) criticize the above mentioned positionand suggest distinguishing guilt as a primary feature of the subjective aspect of a crime and other psychological elements (as purpose,motivation, and emotions) as optional features. On the one hand, this is justified by the position demonstrated by the legislator in determiningof forms and types of guilt. On the other hand, it is supported by the instability of the purpose category, which can lead to its unreasonablybroad understanding and, as a result, to an incorrect understanding of the essence of guilt. According to the author of the article guilt andpurpose are independent, but also interdependent categories. So, denying the purpose directedness of certain guilt types (e.g., direct intention)would be wrong. Firstly, some researchers who offer the definition of direct criminal intent do this by specifying the purpose of thecrime (E.Ya. Nemirovsky, A.Ya. Estrin, V.G. Makashvili, R.I. Mikheev and others). Secondly, it is confirmed by the practice of the courts:to highlight just a direct intent in the actions of the guilty person courts point in the sentences that the person acted with the intention tocause consequences. Thus, we can conclude that the direct criminal intent immanently has purpose, which is expressed in a desire to achievethe anticipated results (socially dangerous consequences). The article also studies the possibility of committing a crime, which includes aspecial purpose with indirect criminal intent. Thus, the author offers a critical attitude to the existing axiom in the theory of criminal law aspecial purpose is compatible only with the direct intention and admits the possibility of combination of a special purpose with any kind ofintended form of guilt. It is justified, on the one hand, by the psychology data, according to which any realized volitional action is purposefuland committed to achieve some goal. Therefore, any intended crime (as a special case of volitional action) always assumes such characteristic,regardless of whether a special purpose is specified in the text of the law or not. On the other hand, the criticized axiom assumes adominant role in determining the type of intention of the legislator only. It turns out that the intention type depends not on the mental activityof the person. It is pre-determined by the people, who write laws. It is obviously wrong. Therefore, a judge should evaluate an offensemeaningfully in each case, including the purpose of acts, rather than mechanically base on a controversial theoretical concept.

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