New challenges of thermonuclear age or where slogan of ''liberation'' of Eastern Europe is gone

The articleanalyses the US politics towards Eastern Europe in 1954 and the first half of 1955. On the basis of the documents (including thematerials from the US National Archive) the author shows that it was in this period that Eisenhower's Administration made a finaldecision to adopt a new policy in their struggle with the USSR. This change was facilitated by several interconnected factors. First of all,domestic factors that dramatically weakened the ultra-conservative Republican influence in the Congress in the field of foreign policyand in some sense gave the Administration a possibility to act more freely. Among the external factors the author singles out thefollowing: test of the thermonuclear bomb by the USSR in August 1953, increase of the Soviet nuclear potential and means of delivery;development of the situation around Vietnamese village of Dien Bien Phu in March-April 1954 and situation with Quemoy and Matsuislands in September 1954 - March 1955 that put the world on the brink of a thermonuclear war; start of the ''liberation'' policy and NSC174/1. Fast and cruel suppression of the revolt in Western Berlin by the Soviet Army in June 16-17, 1953, as well as the Soviet positionon the Berlin conference in January-February 1954, led American Administration to understanding that Germany and whole EasternEurope is very important for the Kremlin and it will not leave it without a war that no doubt would be total. Therefore, back in thebeginning of 1955 the Administration made a significant correction of its position. In the struggle with communism all strength shouldbe devoted to such actions that would change people's attitude towards communistic ideas and promote their aspiration for freedom.With such an agenda a significant consideration should be paid to the different overt and cover operations aimed at the improvement ofthe free world's image and change in people's attitude towards Soviet policies. Noticeable attention was drawn to the economic measuresaimed at stimulation of the development of less-developed countries, which were considered as possible and attractive targets forcommunist propaganda. Such measures included programs of economic help and stimulation of free trade. In general, one can say withconfidence that on the border of 1954 and 1955 the American political establishment finally accepted the idea that the USA shouldpeacefully coexist with the USSR and should not provoke the possible world war with its activities. As Secretary of Defence Wilson putit, Eisenhower Administration at that point had to ''painfully'' reorganize its policy and, accordingly, elaborate new rules and methods.This reorganization took significant amount of time, especially given the fact that it took longer for the USSR and China to come to theunderstanding of peaceful coexistence. It took two ''Taiwanese'' (1954 and 1958) and a ''Caribbean'' (1961) crises.

Keywords

Authors

References