Germany's role in EU military mission ''EUFOR RD Congo''

It is well known that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) is anintergovernmental component of European integration. It means that the CSDP is determined by the EU member states. Thereforeunderstanding of the CDSP is conditioned by the understanding of the different member states positions. Many scholars argue thatGermany being an EU driving force plays a leading role in the CSDP too. The author revises this thesis by analyzing German foreignpolicybehavior during one of the practical ESDP challenges - the EU military mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUFORRD Congo (2006). He finds out whether the mission met German national interests, to what degree Germany participated in the agendasettingand decision-making process, what Germany's military and financial contribution was. The author comes to a conclusion thatGermany's role in the operation was twofold. On the one hand, it proved itself as a real leader nation by assuming the responsibility forplanning and strategic management of the mission as well as contributing 1/3 of the military contingent and covering 1/5 of the expensesincurred. On the other hand, a practical dimension demonstrated Germany's weak points and secondary role played in the CSDP. TheCongo mission was put on the European agenda by France and Belgium, not Germany. In contrast to the both ex-colonial powers,EUFOR RD Congo was not in Germany's national interest, but in spite of this Berlin got involved in the mission. The formal leadershipand military participation resulted solely from the strong diplomatic and informal pressure exerted by partners. At the same timeGermany's internal political controversy and difficult procedural questions considerably restrained preparation for the operation,threatened with its frustration and thereupon blocked its logical prolongation. German headquarters in Potsdam faced difficulties inplanning and coordination of EUFOR RD Congo. German armed forces had problems with supplies and training of personnel, itspractical contribution to general success was minimal - inter alia owing to the national limitations of its application geography. Theauthor concludes, that partners' as well as some scholars' expectations in relation to Germany's contribution to the CSDP are higher thanGerman political willingness and real military potential.

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