Discussion of rationality in the context of contemporary ethical theories

The relationship definitions of meaningful behavior and moral action are one of the main points of dispute about questions of normativity today. We will appeal probably to the most common question at the intersection of these topics whether morality is rational in general or it is rational to moral action in particular. Perhaps, rethinking of what it means to be rational, or what it means to act rationally, will be promising for the identification and development of modern theories of joint action. I draw attention to a number of difficulties relating to the distinctions of the concepts and research purposes. In the matter of the relationship between rationality and morality at least three problems and accordingly three areas of research can be discerned. If we question the rationality of morality, we must take into account the area of research: whether we discuss the origins of morality, the regulatory-analytical models, or particular actions. In the present study, we turn to some concepts of the theory of morality that are the most popular today. These doctrines offer a variety of methods and in some way oppose each other in response to the major ethical issues. Each of the concepts defines the rationality of morality in different ways. The question of the rationality of morality in terms of turning to its origins (genealogy) does not affect the acceptance of moral norms and building a system of values. For example, for Hume the rational thing is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation but along with it Hume denies the reasonable nature of morality. Further, if we are to determine the rationality of morality in relation to individual actors, it is not only difficult to attribute a rational moral motivation to the action, but also to determine the rationality of acting at all. We do not claim that moral action is not rational, but the difficulty lies in the definition of rationality as such. For example, within the scope of consequentialism it is also difficult to rely on the model of rational action, because a number of issues generally are left out. Such theories even though they say about collective interaction and its positive consequences require other moral doctrines to justify the principle of utility, or satisfactoriness. Then, it is most reasonable to determine the rationality of morality in terms of consistency of its basic principle (for example, respect for others, and (or) the value of human life), as well as in terms of its strict sequence in adherence to rules and norms. Thus, reference to the principle of rationality to address the issue of morality matters most in case when it comes to modeling of a certain system of norms. Such a system of norms, in turn, implies the definition of the basic principle, or the "common good", which will build the whole system. In this case, a more advantageous position is still Kantian ethics, which provides a clear classification of actions. Kant's system is not contrary to the consequentialist doctrines, and is consistent with the ethics of virtue. Perhaps Kant's ethics has to be modified in accordance with the requirements and conditions of the new modernity. But still, in its entirety, it is most preferred in correlation with the ethics of virtue and consequentialism.

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