On the problem of the grounds of moral behaviour

The paper deals with problem of the foundations of practical moral action. In other words, it is the problem of transition from "I ought" to "I will." We can see the main difficulties in the concepts of moral requirements functioning and reasons for their choice that originated in the Western European culture and traditions of research. So, if we interpret morality as a set of stiffened rules that must be applied to a variety of practical situations, the presence of conflict in the form of so-called moral dilemmas and moral issues will be guaranteed. In addition, the causes of the problems are the theoretical gap between the "I am" and "I ought", that is a connection between the anthropological and moral concepts. Concept "Ego Sum'', starting with Descartes, is the concept of human nature of the Enlightenment. The individual in this framework is like a separate atom, driven by the forces of attraction and repulsion in the form of attraction to pleasure and avoidance of suffering. Thus, "I am" appears as "I want", namely, as the rational egoist. In this context, the society and culture are only secondary or superstructural formations that function as tools for satisfaction or limitation of desires. Theoretically, such a transition from the conception of human behaviour to the idea of duty as the principle of human action is impossible. It is possible to assert that within this conception the theory of justice will only be acceptable, both theoretically and practically, the one tending to the distributive justice. A good example is the theory of John Rawls. His approach to the conditions of selection of the initial principles of justice requires as a consequence such circumstances, in which selfish individuals must develop into moral persons. In other words, individuals that were constituted owing to profit should be reborn as individuals constituted according to the duty and respect. It is either impossible or requires a broader context for preferences, intentions, motives, than the one in Rawls's original position. Our thesis is that if we assume the possibility of formation of moral behaviour, we must follow another concept of specificity of the human being. It seems that the concept of Heidegger's life as co-existence with Others allows us to show the possibility and presence of the transition from "I ought" to "I will". The concept of co-existence allows us to treat it as an inherent element in the structure of human existence. First, co-existence means that any human feelings, thoughts and actions are not originally inherent in human existence but formed by means of the type of culture in which the individual is born. This means that we should interpret the individual in its own initial state as the individual who is constituted not by personal interests but by the feelings and motives in relation to others. Second, it is logical to assume that co-existence with Others is unthinkable without the presence of some kind of forms or degrees of normativity. Therefore, normativity should also be interpreted as an inherent element in the structure of human existence. Then the formation of a motive of respect, as well as the transition from normativity in general to moral norms, does not appear as a magical leap from no-moral state in the direction of morality, but it is a smooth transition from some norms to other, their transformation and modification.

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