On the enforcement of penal orders

The problem of enforcing rules of conduct relating to law by means of coercion (negative consequences, sanctions) is very relevant and controversial today, including the sphere of penal law. The analysis of the current penal legislation shows a significant number of cases when penal orders are not provided for with real sanctions. The article attempts to identify and analyse two main types of means of coercion while ensuring the implementation of legal orders: measures to enforce the required conduct and measures of responsibility. In particular, cases are established when the relevant rules of conduct for serving a sentence should be provided for only by measures of responsibility, and when by additional measures of the required conduct enforcement. The author also discusses issues actively debated in the literature concerning where to use coercion in penal orders enforcement, and in what form (criminal, administrative, penal or other responsibility, sanctions, or other). In addition, the possibility and limits of changes in original measures of criminal responsibility (including the possibility to change a measure of criminal responsibility in case the convict evades to implement it for another measure) are assessed. The author offers his vision of means of coercion (as mechanisms to ensure relevant regulations) that refer to penal regulation in the form of the following groups of measures: 1) measures to enforce the required conduct; 2) responsibility measures (which can be referred to as penal) which include: change of original measures of criminal responsibility for others (without additional prosecution); sanctions (all cases of additional deprivations and restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the convict, without changing the original measure of criminal responsibility). It is also noted that, along with the above-mentioned measures of penal responsibility, it is expedient to ensure the proper conduct of convicts, if necessary, by measures of criminal and administrative responsibility.

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