The struggle of rational and irrational principles in the history of proof in criminal cases and its correlation with changes in science

The relevance of the topic is due to the fact that the study of proof, including the consideration in this context of the inner conviction of the judge, gives high priority to the empirical perception and subsequent logical manipulation of the evidence. Undoubtedly, this is caused by the modern construction of the criminal process and the existing legal doctrine, according to which proof has a rational nature. Thus, irrational principles are given minimum value. However, the philosophical discourse fixed the idea of postnonclassical rationality characterized by a flexible approach to knowledge and denying the need for complete elimination of subjective factors from this process. In this connection, there is a need to rethink approaches formed several decades ago. The objectives of the study, therefore, are to track the value of irrationality in matters of proof, identify its trends and find its reason for existence. This is done by referring to the most important monuments of the criminal procedural law which reflect the level of development of legal thought and society at a certain stage, taking into account the analysis of changes in science. The final aim of the work is to formulate the problem of the position of irrationality in proving in criminal cases and bring it to the attention of researchers. Considering the basic codified acts issued during the period from the 11th to the 19th centuries and containing rules of criminal procedural law, the author of the article states that in the early stages of the development of the institute of proof irrationality played a leading role, but later did not disappear completely. The change in the role of irrationality correlates with the paradigmatic changes in science - scientific revolutions that represented a change of the types of dominant rationality. At the present stage, the final formulation of the place of irrationality seems in the inner conviction of the judge, which, the author believes, is related to the development of scientific thought. Certainly, the basis of inner conviction in the first place is a logical comparison of the evidence. Thus, the dominance of rationality in proving is not contested. However, exclusion of irrationality in this process can only be considered as a kind of fiction. The question is whether this fiction is useful or not. The author states this issue should be subject to further study.

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