Russia and EU’s «Eastern» enlargement, 1991-2004

After the fall of the Soviet Union new Russian state found itself in the acute economic and political crisis. Economic reforms started by E. Gaidar’s government failed to yield quick result. Country has entered the period of economic transformations that had a strong impact on the quality of life of the most Russians. In such difficult circumstances Russia had to build new relations with the outer world. The most important foreign policy direction at the time was provision of state security and meeting the basic requirements of Russian people during the conduct of reforms. Therefore the EU’s decision to start the enlargement process in the Eastern Europe was viewed mostly positively in Russia. After the beginning of the German unification process Russian leadership saw in European Union a stabilizing factor in Europe, a counterbalance to the USA. In 1994 Russian government accepted the proposal made by the EU to sign the “Partnership and cooperation agreement” (PCA), which could allow regulating relations between new Russia and the EU. In the conditions of 1994 the provisions of the agreement showed the determination of new Russia to join the society of prosperous democratic nations. Initial interpretation of this agreement postulating that Russia is “guided” and the EU is “guide” also was mainly positively perceived in Russian society (although it wasn’t much advertised). Publication of the joint EU strategy towards Russian in 1999, start of the Eastern enlargement process, crisis in Yugoslavia and attempts of the USA to solve it, as well as the experience gained during interaction with the EU in the framework of PCA led to the publication in 1999 first comprehensive and elaborated Strategy of development of the relations between Russian Federation and the European Union in the midterm (2000-2010). The main task of the strategy was to develop equal and mutually beneficial relations between Russia and the EU in the framework of strategic partnership. “Eastern enlargement” was conducted basically without regard to Russian interests. In 1990-s Russian was itself in dire need of help and was going through serious structural reforms that formed new vector of country’s development. In such conditions it seemed vital to follow the advices and lead of European partners in order to build new institutions and develop a new value system. But this period of romaticization of European politics ended quite soon, all the more because despite the prevailing rhetoric about common values national and business interests were often put ahead of everything else and they were very often at odds with Russian interests. European Union having taken the leading role in the relations with Russia failed to understand at what moment Moscow was already economically strong enough to formulate its own economic and national interests. These interests, mostly economic, objectively put Russia into confrontation with EU. It was a time not only to listen, but to hear each other. Unfortunately that did not happen in the years to come.

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