Russian-Chinese relations in the sphere of regional and international security after 2014

In this article the author examines the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis for Russian Federation, China and the Russian-Chinese relations in the sphere of traditional (military) and non-traditional security threats. Two states differently involved in the events in Ukraine and the consequences for them are also different. In conditions of acute antagonism between Russia and Western countries becomes a quite natural consequence of activation of Russian-Chinese cooperation. And this process has both positive and negative consequences. In the sphere of military security the positions of the both sides are the closest. A revitalization program in the US missile defense in the East Asia, could(?) make cooperation in this field even more intense. Including attempts to create a unified Russian-Chinese missile defense system. However, over time, in the medium-term perspective, China will become more autonomous in the matter of production of weapons and equipment, and cooperation in this area will be minimized. In the framework of international organizations will also be apparent significant changes in the relations between the two countries. For example, participants in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will establish a central bank (mostly to finance Chinese projects), and eventually unified military contingent, military bases or without initially. In this case, the organization will increasingly become a "Chinese project", in which the influence of Russia will be minimized. APEC and the East Asia Summits will also strengthen China's influence, by reducing the influence of Russia and suspicion of countries to the actions of Russian and US policy. In the area of non-traditional security threats the energy and food security will be of a great intensity. In general, Russia is increasingly dependent on a single buyer of energy - China, and it is a cause for concern. In May 2014 was concluded gas "contract of the century" on gas deliveries to China, with prices at least 10% lower (but even more so 15%), than in the European direction. And in the case of failure in the future of the European Union to buy Russian gas, the China can negotiate an even lower price tag. It does not meet Russian interests and national security of the Russian Federation. In the area of food after the Russian retaliatory sanctions, China has also become one of the principal partners of our country. Beijing is increasingly playing a major role in Russian-Chinese tandem. However, in this way will inevitably grow the level of antagonism between the two countries. Especially, in Central Asia, where very strong Chinese influence will grow. In general, we can say that the intensity of cooperation between Russia and China in the field of security will grow dramatically. But it would be a "reluctant friendship".

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