The reaction of Lyndon B. Johnson administration to the EU and NATO crises (1965-1966)

The author investigates the debates in the United States, concerning tactical measures in response to de Gaulle's offensive. Finally, the article examines the Johnson administration's cooperation with the European allies to resolve the NATO crisis. In the mid-1960s, two crises - the ‘empty chair' crisis in the EEC and de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces from the military organization of NATO - challenged the main objectives of the European policy of Johnson administration. The ‘empty chair' crisis paralyzed the functioning of the EEC and complicated the Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiations. France's withdrawal from the military organization of NATO threatened the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. Until recently, historians have analyzed two crises separately. Scholarly interest has tended to focus on the Atlantic policy of Johnson administration. Researchers have not given sufficient attention to the linkage between the American attitudes to the EEC and NATO crises. Using published documents of the Department of State and memoirs of American politicians, this research examines the reactions of the Johnson administration to the both crises. The article first addresses the reasons and preconditions of the ‘empty chair' crisis, the American attitude to it, and the influence of the EEC crisis on the GATT negotiations. The research then focuses on French policy toward NATO. A comparison of the American reactions to the EEC and NATO crises demonstrates that the Johnson administration viewed the French attacks on the EEC and NATO as a single chain of crises provoked by de Gaulle. American politicians feared that de Gaulle could mix economic, currency and security mattes in order to torpedo the EEC and NATO. The US Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization evaluated the ‘empty chair' crisis as more dangerous for the development of the EEC than France's withdrawal from the military organization of NATO for the existence of the Alliance. For tactical reasons, the Johnson administration avoided public attacks on de Gaulle's policy. American actions in response to France's withdrawal from NATO's military organization were aimed to minimize its effect on both the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC. The author believes, that calm reaction to the NATO crisis allowed the Johnson administration to cope with de Gaulle's ‘double challenge'. The NATO crisis gave the Americans a good chance to reaffirm their commitments to the Atlantic Alliance and European integration. The Johnson administration also used the crisis to begin the adaptation of NATO to new tasks in the coming period of detente.

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