Kurdish question in the Middle East policy of the administration of J Carter in 1979-1980

The article analy/es the Kurdish question in the U.S. Middle East policy in 1979-1980. While working on the subject, the author have used a wide range of sources on American foreign policy such as collection “Foreign Relations of United States”, collection “The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy”, the memoirs of key participants in the researching events (J. Carter, Zb. Br/e/inski, S. Vance, H. Jordan), the materials of the American periodical press and documents of the Central Intelligence Agency. The key events that affected the development of whole system of International Relations occurred during the period under review: the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) and the formation of an Islamic republic, the end of the CENTO block, the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt (as a result of Camp David's negotiation process), the beginning of Saddam Hussein's one-man rule in Iraq, the creation of Kurdistan workers party (PKK) in Turkey, the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan. In these conditions, the Kurdish liberation movement in Iran, Iraq and Turkey intensified, which was noticed in Washington. The CIA was instructed to study the issue of the possibility of using Kurds for actions toward growing tensions relations between USA and Iran. However, the American leaders faced a number of obstacles that prevented collaboration with the Iranian Kurds. The necessity to take into account of the political positions of Turkey, Iraq and Iran with which the US does not want to spoil (in the case of Iran - further aggravate) relations, has narrowed the space for American maneuver in the Kurdish issue. The author notes that the Kurdish question became one of the key issues in U.S. Iranian policy after the sei/ure of the embassy of the USA by the radical mass of Iranian students in November 1979, when the high level American politics (first of all the national security adviser Zb. Br/e/inski) were considering the possibilities of military intervention. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced the Carter Administration to weigh the risks and possible consequences of military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Administration has ceased to consider the issue of military pressure in policy toward Iran and stopped considering usability of the Kurdish activities after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. The author concludes that the American government was forced to abandon the use of the Kurdish movement in its own interests, since it was important to observe a balance of interests in the region and achieved its stabili/ation after a number of major upheavals. However, USA leaders did not lose interest in the Kurdish question and remained it in sight as one of the possible levers of pressure on the regional political situation.

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