The failure of the British policy in the Greeco-Turkish war of 1919-1922

The article tells about the failure of the political course of Lloyd George's Coalition Government pursued by them until the final stage of the Greeco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. The study of the materials contained in the Documents on British foreign policy 1919-1939 edited by Professor W.N. Medlicott of Oxford University, in particular from volume 17, covering the events of the period from January 1921 till September 1922, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates of the House of Commons , as well as those contained in the works of a number of British historians, telling about the meetings of the British Cabinet held in September - October of 1922 during the Chanak crisis, suggests the conclusion, that the British Government made every effort to preserve as much as possible from the Treaty of Sevres, enhance Greek military forces, and was ready to start military operations against the army of the Kemalists. The worsening of the relations with France and Italy who had concluded separate agreements with Turkey, military preparations of the Cabinet, the risk of the open military clash with the Turkish forces caused dissatisfaction of some of the ministers of the Cabinet, parliamentarians and political quarters. The failure of the Near East political course, and the dissatisfaction in the home policy offered a pretext for the leadership of the Conservative Party to break a coalition and pass over to the traditional way of the governance of the country.

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