The Concept of "Action" in the H.L.A. Hart's Analytic Philosophy of Law: the Genesis and the Meaning

On the basis of the J.L. Austin's theory of performatives utterances and its comparison with the Hart's theory of the primary and secondary rules it's made the conclusion about genetic and theoretical succession of understanding the action in the analytic philosophy of law due to the theory of speech acts. Hart's analytic philosophy is full of the ideas L. Witgenstein's last works and Austin's theory of speech acts. «Concept of Law» is founded on understanding the system of law as a system of primary and secondary rules and deduces from certain point of Austin's understanding doing action. It's necessary: a) to reconstruct the Hart's the way of thinking on the point of his understanding the law as mobile unity of primary and secondary rules; b) due to the idea of relevance of Austin's theory of performative utterances and Hart's theory of primary and secondary rules, we have to study the categorical accordance and problems that follows from the it's theoretical succession. Let's make a question about the way of connection of the «Con-cept of Law» with Austin's theory of performatives utterances. It's necessary to pay attention to Austin's doctrine of the Infelicities that is devoted to necessary conditions of successful or unsuccessful communication. The subjects of Austin's analysis are becoming the conditions that make the communication difficult. It's obvious that the genesis of concept of action repeats the structure of Austin's the meaning of action as performative is given by Hart's distinction in his theory of ascription and has important and fundamental meaning to the creating the system of law as the system of primary and secondary rules. It shows the common theoretical and methodological field of performative utterances and Hart's analytic philosophy of law and inner unity Hart's philosophy at all.

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