The epistemic paradox of George Moore from the viewpoint of two-valued algebra of formal ethics

A new approach to Moore's paradox is developed by considering the epistemic modalities not as true or false propositions but as good or bad actions in two-valued algebra of formal ethics. A precise evaluation-functional definition of the notion "formal-axiological-inconsistency-of-activity" is given. It is proved that Moore's paradox is not a formal-logical-inconsistency-of-thought but a formal-axiological-inconsistency-of-activity. The proof of formal-axiological inconsistency of Moore's absurd-sentence is performed by "computing" a relevant evaluation-table in the two-valued algebra of formal ethics. In this algebra "knowledge", "assumption", "faith", "doubt", "skepticism" and other epistemic modalities relevant to the topic are considered not as attitudes to logic forms of either true or false propositions but as either good or bad action forms deprived of their contents. In general, "knowledge", "assumption", "faith", "doubt", etc. are considered (and precisely defined) in the paper as moral-evaluation-functions determined by finite sets of moral-evaluation-variables. In the two-valued algebra of formal ethics these variables take their values from the set {g (good), b (bad)} in the proper moral meanings of the words "good" and "bad". The evaluation-functions take their values from the same set. Elements of the set are called "moral values of actions (and action-forms)". Moral-forms of simple actions (deprived of their contents) play the role of (axiological) variables. Moral-forms of compound actions (deprived of their contents) represent moral-evaluation-functions. Complex moral-action-forms are obtained by applying moral (formal-ethical) operations to the variables. In the two-valued algebra under consideration a precise evaluation-functional definition of the notion "formal-axiological-law-of-activity" is given. According to this definition the absurd-sentence noticed by Moore is a violation of formal-axiological-law-of-activity. On the set of moral actions and moral action-forms (deprived of their contents) a formal-axiological-equivalence-relation is defined precisely as well. This strict evaluation-functional definition gives a possibility to generate lists of formal-axiological equations in the two-valued algebra of formal ethics. Combining the definition of formal-ethical-equivalence-relation with the moral-evaluation-functional definitions of the epistemic modalities in question heads to an interesting system of formal-ethical equations illuminating the paradox of Moore.

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