Referential use of definite descriptions: semantic and pragmatic approaches
The phenomenal specificity of referential use of definite descriptions is explicated and a comparative analysis of semantic and pragmatic approaches to it is provided. The theory by H. Wettstein, assimilating definite descriptions to demonstratives, and the theory by D. Kaplan and G. Marti, assimilating definite descriptions to proper names, are analyzed as examples of the semantic approach. It is shown that both semantic theories make assumptions that are not necessary from the pragmatic point of view. The conclusion is that, ceteris paribus, the pragmatic approach is preferable for reasons of economy.
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Keywords
proper name, demonstrative, pragmatics, semantics, referential and attributive use, definite description, собственное имя, демонстратив, прагматика, семантика, референциальное и атрибутивное употребление, определенная дескрипцияAuthors
| Name | Organization | |
| Borisov Evgeny V. | Tomsk State University | evgeny_borisov@mail.ru |
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