Kant's theory of Ego in the empirical, transcendental, moral and metaphysical context

The article discusses the Kant's theory of the subjectivity in four different ways: as the doctrine of the transcendental Ego, the empirical Ego, moral and metaphysical Ego. The article analyzes the arguments of Kant on the various difficulties in the methods of givens and knowledge of the empirical, transcendental and metaphysical Ego. Namely: the transcendental Ego can not be known, since it is not given in any experience. Also it is not possible to apply the category to it, since it itself is the source of categories. The only thing we can know about it - that it is. Metaphysical Ego can not be known just like any other thing in itself. Knowledge of the empirical Ego is not different from any other object of knowledge: the same mistakes and errors, the same obstacles and barriers. Next, however, Kant's theory of moral Ego justified to overcome the Cartesian formulation of Ego: Ego as the person in the opposition to Ego as the thing, res. In conclusion, the article argues for the importance of Kant's theory of I for the subsequent tradition: 1) Opening of the formal structure of subjectivity, namely identity; 2) The statement of the impossibility of ascribing to Ego predicate "absolute", "infinite". Because of several factors: a person endowed with the ability to sense perception, but not endowed with the capacity of intellectual contemplation; human reason given by the questions that principle can not answer; people in the ethical sphere imposes a requirement (imperative), what needs no one holy being. 3) Overcoming the understanding Ego by analogy with natural things and reception of this doctrine in the subsequent tradition, in particular, a statement of the actual mode of being of the Self. 4) Fixing impossibility expansion of personal integrity. Demonstrating the importance of this doctrine by the example of the reification of the Jews in the practice of the Third Reich.

Keywords

Authors

References