Isaiah Berlin and problems with the definition of freedom

The article deals with a study of the problems with the definition of freedom by the means the analytic philosophy of language on an example of Isaiah Berlin's concept of freedom of. Certain critical arguments against his approach, their strengths and weaknesses, are represented. As it is known, the idea of distinguishing between a negative and a positive sense of the term «freedom» goes back at least to Kant, and was examined and defended in depth by Isaiah Berlin in the 1950s and '60s. Discussions about positive and negative freedom normally take place within the context of political and social philosophy. They are distinct from, though sometimes related to, philosophical discussions about free will. Work on the nature of positive liberty often overlaps, however, with work on the nature of autonomy. As Berlin showed, negative and positive freedom are not merely two distinct kinds of freedom; they can be seen as rival, incompatible interpretations of a single political ideal. Since few people claim to be against liberty, the way this term is interpreted and defined can have important philosophical implications. It has also suggested that the idea of distinguishing between a negative and a positive sense of the term of freedom is for the several reasons ineffective.

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