Emergent properties of language processes in the mind

In this paper, we shall cover the theoretical and methodological fundamentals of emergentism in contemporary philosophy of mind and linguistics. The main purpose is to pinpoint the benefits of emergent models in the context of non-reductive functionalism, the theory of syntactic complexity and conceptual semantics. In our view, the dynamic model of the structuring process of elementary components allows associate the mind-body problem of consciousness with the problem of syntactic complexity and properties of non-strict semantics. The emergent structuring is dynamic, flexible, variable, and prone to compromise on the rules that have shaped the structural elements. In our view, this key feature of consciousness (multiple vague interpretation) is reflected in the semantics and pragmatics of the language sign. We proceed from the statement that the "challenging problem" of consciousness, the result of a specific ontology of the language sign. The semantic and pragmatic nature of a linguistic sign may be considered a link between mental states, phenomenal judgments (self-assessment), and mental causation. The article substantiates the idea that the emergent approach may help avoiding the linear downward causation and reductive physicalism, while the qualitative emergentism may be represented in terms of conceptual semantic processes. The emergent properties of language and consciousness result from the constraints imposed by different ontological areas: brain structure, principles of organization of cognitive activity, social relations, varieties of interactional contexts, etc. The emergence approach explains both substrate and functional properties of the relation between the brain and consciousness. Language semantics exists because the brain processes "do not happen in the dark." The phenomena of the qualitative experience are organized in a specific way: there is a whole hierarchy of phenomenal judgment supporting the relation between semantics and ontology. Yet, it does not matter whether it is about the tangible or imaginary world. Apparently, the "gap" between the mental component and the physical causes of these contents is filled with a certain meta-level where the interdependent relationship between the "external" and "internal" consciousness, speech and language, denotation and connotation are implemented. It is at this level that the restrictions of the numerous ontological areas are imposed.

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