Evolution of the concept of the mental state as a qualitative characteristic of the mental activity

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the Spinoza's notion of "affect" and "mental state" of John Searle. It is concluded that Spinoza's affect is a prototype of the notion of mental state, which is highly admitted as an essential element of the subject's mental life in the contemporary philosophy of mind. The analysis of contemporary philosophy of mind allows to assert that philosophical ideas about mental states are a continuation of the Modern's Philosophy theorizing. But it is inacceptable to identify a mental state as an affect or vice versa for the next reasons: • Affect is presented as a phenomenon, connected with body, but without determination by brain. • Affect is an idealistic concept, though it is not related with the classical Cartesian dualism • The concept of the mental state, originated from the materialistic ideas about mind, consciousness and their functioning, is still developing now. In particular, a conceptual model of John Searle shows a causal connection between physical and mental. His premise leads to the obvious conclusion that psychical activity ends with the death of a subject, primarily the brain's death. Similarities between the notions of the affect and the mental state: 1. Both phenomena are able to predetermine the set of possible cognitive functions. 2. A way of affect's existing, as a stage, is similar to the mental state. Their stages could be formalized as a genesis-development-result scheme.

Keywords

Authors

References