The Role of the Moral Principle in the Creation and Functioning of the Idea of Responsibility

The article analyzes the links between the idea of historical responsibility and the general moral principle. It is argued that the search for such a general moral principle is the relevant basis for interpreting the idea of responsibility. The article aims to determine the possible content of this principle. For this, the idea of responsibility is analyzed. It is shown that responsibility should be understood not as a consequence after an expected or required action, but as a structural element of the requirement itself. It is noted that the actualization of the idea of responsibility is linked with the transition from the dominance of theories of virtue to deontological theories and the formation of the concept of the individual during the Enlightenment. It is emphasized that the thesis of moral responsibility presupposes both the existence of appropriate principles or situations, recognized as moral, and the application of appropriate sanctions. It is argued that the implementation of this thesis is guaranteed by the application of a general moral principle. The modern approaches to the search for such a principle are considered, namely the widespread statement about the preference of coherentism rather than deductivism. The basic requirement of coherentism that moral judgments should mutually support each other is analyzed. It is argued that the most acceptable way to implement this approach is not the heterogeneity of moral judgments, but their submission to a general principle. It is argued that the principle should be considered as preferred if a) it can sum up other principles that claim the status of a general principle; b) it opens up broader prospects in the search for specific diverse norms, under which various situations can be summed up. The thesis is formulated that the Kantian idea of dignity most corresponds to these requirements. These ideas were applied to the interpretation of historical responsibility. It is proposed to interpret historical responsibility as responsibility for preserving knowledge (memory) about the past. The connection of this interpretation with modern concepts of temporality, which asserts the heterogeneity and multidirectionality of time lines, is shown. It is emphasized that the use of Kantian interpretations of dignity and respect provides a search criterion for a moral attitude to the past and allows creating an appropriate framework for the interpretation of certain segments of the past. It is proposed to interpret the past as a tragic experience. It is argued that this interpretation of knowledge about the past makes it possible to give the idea of historical responsibility a universally significant meaning and become the basis for intercultural dialogue. It is shown that historical responsibility can be interpreted as a necessary means of achieving mutual respect, especially in the public sphere.

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