Ability of imagination in Kant's Ontology

The article is dedicated to function of ability of imagination in Kant's ontology. This function by the most detailed and exhaustive way is presented to M. Heidegger's interpretations, stated in his early lecture courses "Phanomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft" and "Kant und das Problem der Metaphusik". The unique, author's interpretation is first presented in article, poorly known to the Russian-speaking reader; arguments "in advantage" fundamental nature of ability of imagination are secondly catalogued; thirdly, is carried out border between "authentic" and "modernizing" reading of "Critique", between the reading corresponding "to a letter and spirit" the original, and development of own ontology by M. Heidegger on the basis of interpretation Kant's works . In article three fragments from «Critique of Pure Reason» where it is a question of ability of imagination are analysed: it §10 - 6 paragraphs dividing the table of judgments and the table of categories; the section about schemes of pure rational concepts; also the section about apprehension synthesis, reproduction synthesis, recognition synthesis. In article on the example of interpretation §10 " Critique" it is shown that idea of fundamental nature of ability of imagination is completely authentic and corresponding to the "Critique" text, and also that Kant's author's editing in the second "Critique" edition, generates only coherent contradictions in the specified fragment and the text as a whole. On a material of interpretation of the section about schemes the correctness of Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental power of imagination as the ability defining time and being a source of the content of pure rational concepts is shown. On a material of interpretation of three synthesis the "mixed" nature of Heidegger's interpretation concerning synthesis of an apprehension and synthesis of a reproduction, and obviously modernizing nature of interpretation concerning synthesis of a recognition is shown. It is shown that interpreting recognition synthesis as «directed on the future», M. Heidegger: 1) actually ignores the Kant's doctrine about ability of imagination as ability by means of which it is possible "to represent the past and the future"; 2) modernizes Kant's idea of subjectivity as having temporary structure that there doesn't correspond to Kant's judgment about our knowledge concerning "the transcendental subject". In article it is indicated also dual nature of the Heidegger's interpretation which is guided both by a canon of "a historical hermeneutics", and a canon of "a philosophical hermeneutics" that partly darkens actually "historical" value of interpretation of ability of imagination as fundamental ability.

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